



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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May 31, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: PRM/NSC-11

The attached report has been prepared by a special interagency drafting team for SCC consideration in response to the requirements of Section 3 of PRM/NSC-11. It is intended to provide a reasonable starting point for SCC deliberations that will result in recommendations to the President on the future mission and structure of the Intelligence Community. It should be read in conjunction with the separate reports prepared by the DCI and Attorney General PRM/NSC-11 Subcommittees.

The first SCC meeting on PRM/NSC-11 is scheduled for 8 June at 10:00 a.m. in the White House Situation Room. The agenda for this meeting will be:

- a. How to structure the PRM/NSC-11 decisionmaking process
- b. Strategy for dealing with Congress
- c. Views on structural options
- d. Views (time permitting) on "other solutions."

cc: Mr. Lipshutz
Mr. Eizenstat

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Zbigniew Brzezinski

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Classified by: Z. Brzezinski

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REPORT

on

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW MEMORANDUM/NSC-11

INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE and MISSION

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INTRODUCTION

This report is submitted to the NSC Special Coordination Committee for its consideration in fulfillment of the responsibilities assigned to it by the President in PRM/NSC-11. The report draws on material prepared in support of both the DCI and Attorney General PRM/NSC-11 SCC sub-committee deliberations and reflects extensive written departmental inputs and deliberations within a special senior level Working Group.

The report consists of four principal parts related to each other in the following manner:

-- Section I, Objectives and Principles for US Foreign Intelligence, provides the essential broad criteria against which any improvement options, especially organizational, ought to be judged. They are what the President should expect from intelligence and are in effect a broad set of guiding principles.

-- Section II, Problem Areas, then defines and analyzes the basic problem areas within the Intelligence Community in the present organizational, leadership and political environment. It is based on a comprehensive review of US foreign intelligence activities but is not itself a definitive critique. Its purpose rather is to provide enough background on the present performance of the community to comprehend the implications of possible organizational and other changes in terms of their impact on major difficulties encountered by the present system.

-- Section III, Structural Options, begins with a concise description of the present structure, then identifies a representative range of organizational options. It is not intended to be theoretically comprehensive but rather to portray real-world possibilities responsive to the guiding principles and problems previously identified in Sections I and II of this report.

-- Section IV, Other Solutions, recognizes that while organizational changes may resolve some of the problems associated with the management and operation of the Intelligence Community, there are other problems that will be virtually unaffected by structural change. It identifies certain perennial problems that will require sustained and creative attention by Intelligence managers and on which the President should be kept informed.

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